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During his four decades as a judge before his dissent in Abrams v. 
United States in November 1919, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., mostly 
shared the general hostility of American judges to free speech claims.  
His decisions for a unanimous Supreme Court in March 1919, which 
upheld convictions for antiwar speech during World War I, resembled 
his earlier opinions restricting free speech in many contexts.  Between 
March and November 1919, Holmes joined the growing number of 
Americans who had become much more sympathetic to freedom of 
expression during and immediately after the war.  Holmes revealed his 
transformed views in his Abrams dissent even while asserting that they 
had not changed, but elements of his previous restrictive approach 
lingered. 
I.  THE RESTRICTIVE JUDICIAL TRADITION 
From the Civil War through World War I, the overwhelming 
majority of American judges rejected free speech claims.1  Many 
decisions did not even address free speech issues raised by litigants.  
The pervasive judicial hostility toward free speech included all levels of 
the state and federal judiciary and all regions of the United States.  It 
extended to all varieties of expression, whatever the topic and whoever 
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 1 See generally DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 129–76 (1997) 
(providing an overview of these cases in a chapter entitled “The Courts and Free 
Speech”).  
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the speaker.  Courts upheld convictions for libel, slander, and contempt 
of court.  They upheld exclusions of material deemed obscene or 
immoral from the mail.  They upheld restrictions on political 
campaigning and expenditures, prohibitions against speaking on public 
property, and injunctions against language used by unions.  They denied 
protection to commercial advertising and movies.  Even within this 
pervasive hostility, the United States Supreme Court stood out as 
particularly restrictive.  It typically rejected free speech claims in 
unanimous opinions.  The only significant dissent in a free speech case 
between Holmes’s appointment to the Supreme Court in 1904 and his 
dissent in Abrams was by Justice Harlan, the sole dissenter from a 
majority opinion written by Holmes. 
Legal decisions rejecting free speech claims rarely contained much 
analytical content.  Many relied on Blackstone’s treatment of free speech 
in his Commentaries on the English common law, published shortly 
before the American Revolution.  Blackstone famously asserted that the 
English common law precludes prior restraints on expression but 
allows subsequent punishment for the “bad tendency” of speech to harm 
the public welfare.  In addition to applying Blackstone’s formulation to 
American common law, American judges concluded that the First 
Amendment and state constitutional provisions on free speech 
incorporated it into American constitutional law. 
American judges overwhelmingly deferred to the “police power” of 
legislators and administrators to determine the “bad tendency” of 
speech.  As many critics observed at the time, this deference to 
regulation of speech contrasted dramatically with decisions that 
invalidated economic and social legislation as infringing constitutional 
rights of property and “liberty of contract.”  When a law did not directly 
address speech, judges often punished language they believed had a bad 
tendency to cause an action the law prohibited. 
Even more than the widespread rejection of free speech claims 
across a wide variety of subjects and speakers, judges revealed their 
hostility by often ignoring them entirely.  Rejecting a claim at least gives 
it the minimal respect of attention.  Ignoring a claim makes it invisible, 
suggesting it does not exist.  In many cases, lawyers raised free speech 
issues that judges did not address.  In similar cases, lawyers themselves 
did not raise speech issues, probably because they realized that judges 
might not address them and if they did, would almost certainly reject 
them. 
Despite the overwhelming judicial hostility to free speech, a small 
minority of cases, mostly in state courts, occasionally protected it in 
circumstances that would normally have led to convictions.  A few 
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protective decisions concluded that speech did not have a bad tendency 
to harm the public welfare.  A very few refused to apply the bad 
tendency test at all, finding it inconsistent with the necessary role for 
free speech in a democracy. 
These protective decisions underline the restrictiveness of the 
dominant judicial treatment of free speech during the decades before 
World War I.  They demonstrate that judges were not confined by an 
established legal tradition that would have required an intellectual 
breakthrough to transform.  Judges who rejected or ignored free speech 
claims knew there were alternative approaches and consciously 
rejected them.  Before his dissent in Abrams, Holmes revealed in 
numerous decisions that he was in the mainstream of the repressive 
judicial tradition and not among the rare judges who protected free 
speech. 
II.  HOLMES’S DECISIONS BEFORE WORLD WAR I 
During his long career as a judge, Holmes wrote opinions in many 
free speech cases.  While serving on the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, he addressed the right of a police officer to solicit money 
for political purposes, the right of a minister to speak on the Boston 
Common, and the rights of labor picketers.  After he joined the United 
States Supreme Court, he addressed the contempt conviction of a 
publisher who was also a United States Senator for criticizing justices 
on the Colorado Supreme Court, and the conviction of the editor of an 
anarchist newspaper for an article that urged a boycott of businesses 
responsible for the arrests of nude bathers. 
Holmes’s opinion for the majority of the Supreme Court in 
Patterson v. Colorado,2 from which Justice Harlan dissented, is the most 
significant and revealing of his decisions about free speech before World 
War I.  Thomas Patterson was a Democratic Senator from Colorado who 
owned and edited several newspapers in the state.  His newspapers 
supported an amendment of the state constitution to provide home rule 
for Denver.  When the majority of the Colorado Supreme Court 
subsequently invalidated the amendment on state constitutional 
grounds, Patterson’s newspapers published editorials, cartoons, and 
letters portraying the judges as tools of the utility companies that 
controlled the state Republican Party.  At the request of the Colorado 
Supreme Court, the state attorney general brought criminal contempt 
 
 2 205 U.S. 454 (1907). 
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proceedings against Patterson.  The Colorado Supreme Court convicted 
and fined Patterson.3 
Writing for eight justices, Holmes left “undecided” whether the 
First Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment,4 an issue the Court did not resolve until 1925 when it held 
that it does.5  He maintained that even if the First Amendment did apply 
against state action, it would not preclude Patterson’s contempt 
conviction.6 
Holmes’s opinion exemplified the restrictive interpretation of free 
speech that pervaded the American judiciary in the decades before 
World War I.  He assumed that Blackstone’s formulation of the English 
common law had been incorporated into the provisions on free speech 
in the constitutions of the United States and the individual states.  The 
“main purpose” of these provisions, Holmes wrote, was to prevent 
“previous restraints” on publications, not to prevent subsequent 
punishment of those “deemed contrary to the public welfare.”7  
Rejecting Patterson’s defense that he had a right to prove the truth of 
his publications, Holmes maintained that under the constitutional 
provisions, the “preliminary freedom” against previous restraints 
“extends as well to the false as to the true,” but that “the subsequent 
punishment may extend as well to the true as to the false.”8  He ignored 
the assertion in Patterson’s brief that the popular sovereignty 
underlying these constitutions required protection for truthful criticism 
of the official conduct of public officials.  Only through public discussion, 
the brief maintained, “are the people who possess sovereign power 
informed of the merits or demerits of those who are chosen to rule over 
them.”9  
While observing that Blackstone’s formulation of free speech was 
the law of criminal libel, Holmes maintained that it applies “yet more 
clearly to contempts,” which “tend to obstruct the administration of 
justice,” even if true.10  He acknowledged that this tendency is greater 
for juries than for judges because judges “perhaps, are less 
apprehensive that publications impugning their own reasoning or 
 
 3 People v. News-Times Publ’g Co., 84 P. 912, 956 (Colo. 1906); RABBAN, supra note 
1, at 132–33. 
 4 Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462. 
 5 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
 6 Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462.  
 7 Id. at 465 (emphasis in original). 
 8 Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462. 
 9 RABBAN, supra note 1, at 133. 
 10 Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462. 
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motives will interfere with their administration of the law.”11  But he 
concluded that contempts against judges may also be punished if judges 
find them “tending toward such an interference.”12  He added that after 
a case is decided, “courts are subject to the same criticism as other 
people.”13  Patterson’s brief asserted that under Colorado law, a case 
remains pending indefinitely because a petition for rehearing could be 
filed at any time.14  Even if so, Holmes responded, rules about rehearing 
are “questions which the local law can settle as it pleases without 
interference from the Constitution of the United States.”15 
Justice Harlan’s dissent in Patterson highlighted the restrictiveness 
of Holmes’s opinion and demonstrated that more protective 
interpretations of the First Amendment were not beyond the conceptual 
horizon of contemporary judges.  In addition to maintaining that the 
Fourteenth Amendment applies the First Amendment to state action,16 
Harlan briefly but emphatically rejected Holmes’s interpretation of the 
First Amendment.  “I cannot assent to that view,” Harlan wrote, “if it be 
meant that the legislature may impair or abridge the rights of a free 
press and of free speech whenever it thinks that the public welfare 
requires that to be done.”  “The public welfare,” he added, “cannot 
override constitutional privileges.”17 
In Fox v. Washington,18 a subsequent opinion written for a 
unanimous Supreme Court, Holmes, like many other judges during this 
period, rejected free speech claims without even referring to the First 
Amendment.  In contrast to Patterson, the speech punished in Fox did 
not concern disputes over major political issues among important 
public figures.  But Fox is very revealing in demonstrating the extent to 
which judges, including Holmes, were willing to strain to deny 
protection to speech. 
Jay Fox was the editor of the newspaper published by an anarchist 
community.  He published an article entitled “The Nude and the Prudes,” 
which encouraged a “boycott” of local businesses whose owners had 
helped secure the arrests of nude bathers on charges of indecent 
exposure.19  He was convicted under a Washington state statute that 
 
 11 Id. at 462–63. 
 12 Id. at 463. 
 13 Id.  
 14 See RABBAN, supra note 1, at 134. 
 15 Patterson, 205 U.S. at 460. 
 16 Id. at 464 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 17 Id. at 465 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  
 18 236 U.S. 273 (1915). 
 19 Id. at 276. 
RABBAN (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2020  9:20 PM 
46 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:41 
prohibited publishing material “in any form, advocating, encouraging or 
inciting, or having a tendency to encourage or incite the commission of 
any crime, breach of the peace or act of violence, or which shall tend to 
encourage or advocate disrespect for law or for any court or courts of 
justice.”20  Although the article only encouraged a boycott, Holmes 
unconvincingly concluded that “by indirection but unmistakably,” it 
“encourages and incites a persistence in what we must assume would 
be a breach of the state laws against indecent exposure.”21  He 
acknowledged that the article was directed to “a wider and less selected 
audience” than those who might violate the law, but he did not think that 
had any legal significance.22 
 Holmes allowed the punishment of speech for its indirect tendency 
without considering the First Amendment or analogous provisions in 
state constitutions.  Yet the indirect tendency in the Fox case was even 
more attenuated from the possible commission of a crime than in most 
other cases using this restrictive approach.  Holmes provided no 
support for his assumption that encouraging a boycott of businesses 
responsible for arresting nude bathers would have any tendency, 
however indirect, of inducing some fraction of its readers to engage in 
nude bathing themselves.  And even though the law punished 
publications that “tend to encourage or advocate disrespect for law,” 
Holmes asserted without any explanation that, “by implication at least,” 
the state court had interpreted “disrespect” as “confined to encouraging 
an actual breach of law.”23  The extent to which Holmes obviously 
strained to preserve the legality of this conviction underlines his lack of 
sensitivity to interests in free speech. 
In prior opinions as a judge on the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, Holmes produced some of his most famous dismissive 
epigrams while rejecting free speech claims.  Upholding the firing of a 
policeman who violated a regulation by soliciting money for political 
purposes, Holmes wrote, “[t]he petitioner may have a constitutional 
right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a 
policeman.”24  The United States Supreme Court reached a similar result 
in upholding the constitutionality of a federal statute prohibiting 
employees of the United States from soliciting or receiving money for 
political purposes.25  The Supreme Court did not even address the 
 
 20 Id. at 275–76. 
 21 Id. at 276–77. 
 22 Id. at 277–78. 
 23 Id. at 275, 277. 
 24 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). 
 25 See Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882). 
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petitioner’s assertion that the statute violated the First Amendment.26  
Just as he denied protection to the speech of public employees, Holmes 
denied the right of citizens to speak on public property.  When a minister 
challenged his arrest for speaking on the Boston Common without the 
permit required by a city ordinance, Holmes responded, “[f]or the 
legislature absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a 
highway or public park is no more an infringement of the rights of a 
member of the public than for the owner of a private house to forbid it 
in his house.”27  The United States Supreme Court quoted this sentence 
in affirming the minister’s conviction.28 
Though Holmes used memorable language, these decisions, like his 
later decisions as a Supreme Court justice, typified the rejection of free 
speech claims by the American judiciary.  Yet a minority of judges 
reached more protective results in similar cases.  The Supreme Court of 
Virginia, for example, invalidated a law that prohibited political 
activities by public officials.29  It maintained that the state constitutional 
protection for free speech is “guaranteed to all the citizens of the state, 
not to any portion or any class of citizens.”30  The denial of this 
protection to public employees, it concluded, violated the state 
constitution.31  During Reconstruction, the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina affirmed the right to conduct a noisy but peaceful celebration 
of the Emancipation Proclamation on public property.  The court 
stressed that “in a popular government like ours, the laws allow great 
latitude to public demonstrations, whether political, social, or moral.”32  
The supreme courts of Michigan and Wisconsin invalidated ordinances 
restricting parades on public streets.  The Michigan court warned that 
unregulated official discretion to control parades “would enable a 
mayor or council to shut off processions of those whose notions did not 
suit their views or tastes, in politics or religion, or any other matter on 
which men differ.”33  The Wisconsin court similarly claimed that the 
ordinance allowed “petty tyranny” and was “entirely un-American, and 
in conflict with the principles of our institutions and all modern ideas of 
civil liberty.”34 
 
 26 See id. 
 27 Commonwealth v. Davis, 39 N.E. 113, 113 (1895).  
 28 See Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47 (1897). 
 29 Louthan v. Commonwealth, 79 Va. 196, 206 (1884). 
 30 Id. at 206. 
 31 Id. 
 32 State v. Hughes, 72 N.C. 25, 28 (1875) (per curiam). 
 33 In re Frazee, 30 N.W. 72, 76 (Mich. 1886). 
 34 In re Garrabad, 54 N.W. 1104, 1107 (Wis. 1893). 
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In at least one dissent as a state court judge, Holmes supported the 
right of free speech more than most of his judicial contemporaries.  
Whereas many courts issued injunctions against labor picketing, and 
sometimes declared all picketing to be illegal, Holmes maintained that 
peaceful picketing should be protected.  He complained that a labor 
injunction prohibited “organized persuasion or argument, although free 
from any threat of violence either express or implied” and rejected the 
assumption, shared by many judges, that picketing “necessarily carries 
with it a threat of bodily harm.”35  Reflecting the more typical judicial 
view, a federal judge denied the possibility of peaceful picketing.  “When 
men want to converse or persuade,” he asserted, “they do not organize 
a picket line.”36 
III.  HOLMES’S INITIAL DECISIONS IN ESPIONAGE ACT CASES 
In March 1919, eight months before his dissent in Abrams, Holmes 
wrote for a unanimous Supreme Court in its initial decisions reviewing 
convictions for antiwar speech under the Espionage Act of 1917: 
Schenck v. United States,37 Frohwerk v. United States,38 and Debs v. United 
States.39  Like the overwhelming majority of lower federal court judges 
who had decided similar cases, Holmes continued the prewar judicial 
tradition of relying on the bad tendency of speech to uphold the 
convictions. 
Most prosecutions under the Espionage Act were brought under 
Title I, Section 3, which contained three prohibitions: (1) making false 
statements with intent to interfere with the war effort, (2) willfully 
causing or attempting to cause insubordination in the armed forces, and 
(3) willfully obstructing the recruitment and enlistment service.40  The 
prosecutions often charged that antiwar speech constituted an attempt 
to cause insubordination and was itself an obstruction.  As in free speech 
cases before the war, lower courts in Espionage Act cases emphasized 
the tendency of language to produce an illegal act, often maintaining that 
the tendency need not be direct.41 
Debs was by far the most prominent of the defendants in the 
Espionage Act cases that reached the Supreme Court.  His case received 
the most extensive legal arguments and amicus participation, as well as 
 
 35 Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080 (Mass. 1896). 
 36 Atchison, T & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gee, 139 F. 582, 584 (C. C. S. D. Iowa 1905).  
 37 249 U.S. 47, 48 (1919). 
 38 249 U.S. 204, 205 (1919). 
 39 249 U.S. 211, 212 (1919).  
 40 The Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (1917). 
 41 See RABBAN, supra note 1, at 257–58. 
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the most attention from the public.  Yet Holmes discussed the First 
Amendment in Schenck and then relied on Schenck in Frohwerk and 
Debs.  He probably did so because the defendants in Schenck mailed 
antiwar circulars to men who had been drafted or accepted for military 
service.  They posed a more likely danger of insubordination and 
obstruction than the more general audiences for the antiwar speech in 
Frohwerk and Debs. 
As described by Holmes, the circulars mailed by Schenck 
maintained that “a conscript is little better than a convict,” asserted that 
conscription was “in the interests of Wall Street’s chosen few,” and 
urged “peaceful measures such as a petition for the repeal” of the 
Espionage Act.42  Holmes concluded that “the documents would not have 
been sent unless it had been intended to have some effect, and we do not 
see what effect it could be expected to have upon persons subject to the 
draft except to influence them to obstruct the carrying of it out.”43  
Holmes then began his single paragraph about the First Amendment by 
characterizing the defendants as taking the position that even if this 
“was the tendency of this circular, it is protected by the First 
Amendment.”44  He apparently did not believe the document could have 
had its stated purpose of encouraging a petition for the repeal of the 
Espionage Act. 
The government’s brief in Debs conceded that the First Amendment 
might restrict the power of a legislature to regulate speech, providing 
more protection than Blackstone’s prohibition against prior 
restraints.45  Perhaps in response, Holmes in Schenck retreated from his 
position in Patterson v. Colorado equating the First Amendment with 
Blackstone’s formulation of the English common law.  “It well may be,” 
Holmes wrote without indicating he had changed his views, “that the 
prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of speech is not confined to 
previous restraints, although to prevent them may have been the main 
purpose, as intimated in Patterson v. Colorado.”46  He acknowledged as 
well that “in many places and in ordinary times” the First Amendment 
would protect the circulars.47  But, he added, “the character of every act 
depends on the circumstances in which it is done.”48  In a passage soon 
 
 42 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 50–51 (1919). 
 43 Id. at 51. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Brief for the United States at 81, Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 212 (1919) 
(No. 714). 
 46 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 51–52.  
 47 Id. at 52. 
 48 Id. 
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made famous by Harvard Law professor, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Holmes 
elaborated.  “The question in every case is whether the words used are 
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear 
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that 
Congress has a right to prevent.  It is a question of proximity and 
degree.”49  The circumstances of war, Holmes added, allow restrictions 
on speech that would not be permissible during peacetime.  Holmes 
returned to the tendency of speech at the end of this paragraph.  “If the 
act (speaking, or circulating a paper), its tendency and the intent with 
which it is done are the same,” he concluded while indicating that in this 
case they were the same, “we perceive no ground for saying that success 
alone warrants making the act a crime.”50 
In Frohwerk and Debs, Holmes relied on his brief analysis of the 
First Amendment in Schenck.  He did not repeat his reference to “clear 
and present danger” in either Frohwerk or Debs, but he frequently 
emphasized that antiwar speech can be punished under the Espionage 
Act for its tendency to cause insubordination or to obstruct recruitment.  
Although Holmes conceded that Frohwerk’s antiwar articles were 
published “in a newspaper of small circulation” and that the evidence 
did not indicate “any special effort to reach men subject to the draft,” 
Holmes upheld the conviction despite “the very severe penalty 
imposed” of ten years imprisonment.51  Even while admitting 
weaknesses in the record, Holmes wrote that “we must take the case on 
the record as it is.”52  In a vivid formulation of the bad tendency 
approach, Holmes concluded that “it is impossible to say that it might 
not have been found that the circulation of the paper was in quarters 
where a little breath would be enough to kindle a flame and that the fact 
was known and relied upon by those who sent the paper out.”53  
Similarly relying on the bad tendency approach, Holmes 
maintained that if in the speech for which Debs was convicted “he used 
words tending to obstruct the recruiting service he meant that they 
should have that effect.”54  He observed that this “principle is too well 
established and too manifestly good sense to need citation of the books,” 
but he could have easily cited his own prewar decisions and numerous 
others for support.55  Holmes recognized that the “main theme” of Debs’s 
 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. (citing Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474, 477 (1918)). 
 51 Frowherk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 208–09 (1919). 
 52 Id. at 209. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919). 
 55 Id. 
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speech was the legal discussion of “socialism, its growth, and a prophecy 
of its ultimate success.”56  But he added that “if a part of the manifest 
intent of the more general utterances was to encourage those present to 
obstruct the recruiting service and if in passages such encouragement 
was directly given, the immunity of the general theme may not be 
enough to protect the speech.”57 
Just as a small minority of prewar decisions protected speech that 
Holmes and the overwhelming majority of American judges punished, 
an even smaller minority protected speech prosecuted under the 
Espionage Act.  In Masses Publishing Company v. Patten, one of the first 
cases decided under the Espionage Act, Judge Learned Hand refused to 
apply the bad tendency approach.  In response to the government’s 
argument that the antiwar speech at issue “tends to promote a mutinous 
and seditious temper among the troops,” Hand maintained that “to 
interpret the word ‘cause’ so broadly would . . . involve necessarily as a 
consequence the suppression of all hostile criticism, and of all opinion 
except what encouraged and supported the existing policies, or which 
fell within the range of temperate argument.”58  This consequence, Hand 
asserted, “would contradict the normal assumptions of democratic 
government.”59  “If one stops short of urging upon others that it is their 
duty or their interest to resist the law,” Hand concluded, “it seems to me 
one should not be held to have attempted to cause its violation.”60  In 
construing the obstruction clause, Hand acknowledged that statements 
praising people for conspiracy to resist the draft “have a tendency to 
arouse emulation in others.”61  But he required “some advocacy of such 
emulation,”62 not just a tendency to arouse it, for language to constitute 
obstruction.  The Second Circuit immediately reversed Hand, relying on 
“the natural and reasonable effect of the publication.”63 
A few other lower court judges, without rejecting the bad tendency 
approach, did not find sufficient proximity between antiwar speech and 
the prohibitions of the Espionage Act to justify convictions.  In directing 
a verdict against the government, one judge observed that the speech 
was made informally in a remote village in Montana far from any 
 
 56 Id. at 212. 
 57 Id. at 212–13. 
 58 Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 539–40 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev’d, 246 F. 24 
(2d Cir. 1917). 
 59 Id. at 540. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 541. 
 62 Id. at 542. 
 63 Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24, 39 (2d Cir. 1917). 
RABBAN (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2020  9:20 PM 
52 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:41 
military base.64  Other judges similarly found that the circumstances of 
speech did not justify convictions or refused to convict unless the 
government specified the surrounding circumstances.65  These 
Espionage Act decisions, like the decisions that recognized free speech 
claims during the decades before the war, highlighted the pervasive 
judicial hostility by demonstrating that protective alternatives were 
conceptually available and occasionally applied. 
IV.  HOLMES’S DISSENT IN ABRAMS 
Holmes’s dissent in Abrams, just eight months after his opinions for 
a unanimous Supreme Court in Schenk, Frohwerk, and Debs, was a major 
departure from his prior restrictive views about free speech during his 
four decades as a judge.  The defendants in Abrams had been convicted 
under the Espionage Act as amended in 1918, when Congress added 
prohibitions against “unpatriotic or disloyal” language.66  The 
Department of Justice sought this amendment after the summary 
judgment in the Montana case.67  Though he recognized that most judges 
allowed juries to determine whether speech violated the Espionage Act, 
Attorney General Gregory maintained that this directed verdict 
demonstrated the “ineffectiveness” of the law “when applied by a judge 
not in accord with its purposes.”68 
The majority opinion in Abrams did not focus on the new 
prohibitions in the 1918 amendments, but closely resembled Holmes’s 
opinions in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs.  It cited Schenck and Frohwerk 
as having “definitely negatived” the defendants’ assertion that the 
Espionage Act violated the First Amendment.69  Just as Holmes had 
deferred to the jury’s evaluation of the “natural tendency and 
reasonably probable effect” of Debs’s speech,70 the majority in Abrams 
limited its role to determining whether there was sufficient evidence 
before the jury “fairly tending to sustain the verdict.”71 
Although Holmes asserted that he had no doubts that Schenck, 
Frohwerk, and Debs had been correctly decided,72 his dissent revealed 
the many respects in which he departed from his analysis in those cases.  
 
 64 United States v. Hall, 248 F. 150, 152 (D. Mont. 1918). 
 65 See RABBAN, supra note 1, at 267–69. 
 66 Act of May 16, 1918, Pub. L. 65-150, 40 Stat. 553, 553–54 (1918).  
 67 See supra text accompanying note 64. 
 68 See RABBAN, supra note 1, at 267. 
 69 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 619 (1919). 
 70 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919). 
 71 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 619. 
 72 Id. at 627 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
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In Abrams, he applied a much more rigorous conception of intent.  He 
recognized in Abrams that “the word intent as vaguely used in ordinary 
legal discussion means no more than knowledge at the time of the act 
that the consequences said to be intended will ensue.”  For purposes of 
civil and criminal liability, he added, an even lesser standard of intent 
suffices.  But he maintained that “when words are used exactly” an act is 
not done “with intent to produce it unless the aim to produce it is the 
proximate motive of the specific act.”73  The Espionage Act, he asserted, 
“must be taken to use its words in a strict and accurate sense.  They 
would be absurd in any other.”74 
Yet Holmes in Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs, like most judges in 
Espionage Act decisions, had interpreted intent “as vaguely used in 
ordinary legal discussion” and did not construe the Espionage Act “in a 
strict and accurate sense.”75  He observed in Schenck that “the document 
would not have been sent unless it had been intended to have some 
effect.”76  He acknowledged in Frohwerk that the defendants did not 
make “any special effort to reach men . . . subject to the draft” and that 
the record was weak, but sustained the convictions because “it was 
impossible to say” that the articles did not have a tendency to cause a 
violation of the act.77  And in Debs, he commented approvingly on the 
trial judge’s instruction to the jury that evidence of specific intent could 
be based on the finding that “the words used had as their natural 
tendency and reasonably probable effect to obstruct the recruiting 
service.”78 
In addition to requiring a much stricter interpretation of intent, 
Holmes rephrased the sentence using the term “clear and present 
danger” that he wrote in Schenck but did not include in either Frohwerk 
or Debs.  He made clear in Abrams, as he had not in Schenck, that words 
must come very close to producing an illegal act to justify punishment 
without violating the First Amendment.  In Schenck, he wrote that words 
can be punished when they “create a clear and present danger that they 
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to 
prevent.”79  In Abrams, he wrote that “the United States constitutionally 
may punish speech that produces or is intended to produce a clear and 
imminent danger that it will bring about forthwith certain substantive 
 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 626. 
 75 Id. at 626–27. 
 76 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919).  
 77 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 208–09 (1919). 
 78 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216 (1919). 
 79 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. 
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evils that the United States constitutionally may seek to prevent.”80  
Adding the word “forthwith” indicates a closer relationship between 
speech and crime.  Unlike in Schenck, moreover, Holmes used the word 
“immediate” throughout his dissent in Abrams.  He wrote that “only the 
present danger of immediate evil” or the “immediate danger” that 
expression would hinder the war effort justifies punishment.81  He 
maintained that “the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe 
to fraught with death” should be protected “unless they so imminently 
threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing purposes 
of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country.”82  
“Only the emergency that makes it immediately dangerous to leave the 
correction of evil counsels to time,” he concluded, “warrants making any 
exception to the sweeping command” of the First Amendment.83 
Beyond his new emphasis on immediacy, Holmes’s rephrasing of 
his language in Schenck reveals more protective views about free 
speech.  Instead of “the substantive evils Congress has a right to prevent” 
in Schenck, he referred in Abrams to “certain substantive evils that the 
United States constitutionally may seek to prevent.”  In Abrams, only 
“certain” substantive evils may be prevented, the right to prevent 
becomes the right to “seek to prevent” within constitutional limits, and 
the legal standard applies to the United States, implying all branches of 
government, not just to Congress.  In Abrams, moreover, Holmes 
rejected the government’s argument that the First Amendment did not 
abolish the common law of seditious libel,84 an argument debated in the 
briefs in Debs85 but ignored by Holmes in his decision.  Most memorably, 
Holmes included in Abrams a powerful defense of free speech that had 
no counterpart in his previous Espionage Act decisions and that remains 
famous a century later.  In its core sentence, he wrote that “the ultimate 
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test 
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market.”86 
V.  EXPLANATIONS FOR HOLMES’S TRANSFORMATION IN ABRAMS 
It is easier to identify than to determine the relative weight of the 
numerous possible explanations for Holmes’s transformation in the 
 
 80 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
 81 Id. at 628. 
 82 Id. at 630. 
 83 Id. at 630–31. 
 84 Id. at 630. 
 85 See RABBAN, supra note 1, at 274, 278. 
 86 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
RABBAN (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2020  9:20 PM 
2020] HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 55 
eight months between his unanimous opinions in the initial Espionage 
Act cases and his dissent in Abrams.  Factual differences in the Abrams 
case itself could have led Holmes to a different result and prompted him 
to treat free speech claims more sympathetically.  Holmes characterized 
the “only object” of the leaflet at issue in Abrams that “affords even a 
foundation” for a charge under the Espionage Act “is to help Russia and 
stop American intervention there against the popular government—not 
to impede the United States in the war that it was carrying on” against 
Germany, which was the focus of the Espionage Act.  Any impact of the 
leaflet on the war effort, he maintained, was “an indirect and probably 
undesired effect.”87  In Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs, by contrast, the 
defendants opposed American participation in World War I.  
Underlining the persuasiveness of this difference, the lawyer who wrote 
the government’s briefs in Schenck and Debs himself used it to explain 
in private correspondence his opposition to the prosecution in 
Abrams.88 
The criticism of his earlier Espionage Act decisions by two 
respected law professors and Judge Learned Hand might have prompted 
Holmes to alter his views, though he never acknowledged their 
influence.  Professor Ernst Freund wrote a devastating critique of 
Holmes’s opinion in Debs in The New Republic magazine, a leading 
journal of progressive thought.  Published in May 1919, the article 
criticized Holmes’s analysis because “to be permitted to agitate at your 
own peril, subject to a jury’s guessing at motive, tendency, and possible 
effect, makes the right of free speech a precarious gift.”  By insulating a 
jury’s findings “of a conceivable psychological nexus between words and 
deeds,” Freund suggested, the Espionage Act itself violated the First 
Amendment.89 
Judge Learned Hand, who had rejected the bad tendency approach 
in the Masses case, made a similar point in a letter to Holmes 
immediately after Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs.  Hand disagreed with 
punishing speech under the Espionage Act when “the result is known as 
likely to follow.”  He stressed that juries “won’t much regard the 
difference between the probable result of the words and the purposes 
of the utterer,” citing the numerous convictions under the Espionage Act 
as examples.  Beyond the actual convictions, Holmes’s approach had 
allowed juries to “intimidate” and “scare” many people who might have 
 
 87 Id. at 629.  
 88 See RABBAN, supra note 1, at 350. 
 89 Ernst Freund, The Debs Case and Freedom of Speech, 19 NEW REPUBLIC, May 3, 1919, 
at 13–14, reprinted in Harry Kalven, Jr., Ernst Freund and the First Amendment Tradition, 
40 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 240–41 (1973). 
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“moderate[d] the storms of popular feeling” against antiwar speech.  
Reiterating the views he expressed in Masses, Hand stressed that words 
should be deemed illegal only when they are “directly an incitement.”90 
In “Freedom of Speech in War Time,” published in the June 1919 
issue of the Harvard Law Review, Professor Zechariah Chafee had a 
mixed reaction to Holmes’s initial Espionage Act decisions.  Chafee 
believed that the term “clear and present danger” in Schenck could 
effectively protect free speech, though he regretted that Holmes had 
“not more specifically defined” the “substantive evils” that Congress 
could prevent.  Chafee hoped that Holmes used “substantive evils” to 
“mean overt acts of interference with the war,” which would make “the 
punishment of words for their bad tendency impossible.”91  Chafee 
criticized Holmes in Debs for accepting “the verdict as proof that actual 
interference with the war was intended and was the proximate effect of 
the words used,” which allowed Debs to be convicted “merely because 
the jury thought his speech had a tendency to bring about resistance to 
the draft.”  Chafee called Holmes’s “clear and present danger” phrase in 
Schenck “the Supreme Court test” and maintained that if it “is to mean 
anything more than a passing observation,” it must be applied to reverse 
jury convictions in cases such as Debs.92 
When Harold Laski, an English friend of Holmes who had close 
connections to The New Republic, asked Holmes if he had been 
influenced by Freund’s article, Holmes described it as “rather poor 
stuff.”93  He shared with Laski a letter he had drafted to Herbert Croly, 
the editor of The New Republic, but decided not to send.  The letter 
observed that “Freund’s objection to a jury ‘guessing at motive, 
tendency and possible effect’ is an objection to pretty much the whole 
body of law, which for thirty years I have made my brethren smile by 
insisting to be everywhere a matter of degree.”94  Holmes accurately 
portrayed his longstanding position to Laski, but his transformed 
treatment of intent in Abrams eliminated the loose construction and 
deference to the jury that Freund criticized in Debs. 
Laski also sent Holmes a copy of Chafee’s article and invited both 
of them to tea in July 1919.  Chafee did not think that he had convinced 
 
 90 Letter from Learned Hand to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (late Mar. 1919), 
reprinted in Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment 
Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 758–59 (1975).  
 91 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 967 
(1919). 
 92 Id. at 967–68. 
 93 See RABBAN, supra note 1, at 297. 
 94 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Herbert Croly (May 12, 1919), reprinted 
in 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, 159 n.2 (Mark Howe ed., 1953). 
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Holmes about the Debs case.  He wrote a letter after the tea reporting his 
impression that Holmes continued to think the Supreme Court should 
have deferred to the jury verdict and congressional legislation about the 
war.  Yet Chafee was certain that if Holmes had been on the jury, he 
would have voted to acquit Debs.95  Whether or not ultimately 
influenced by his discussion with Chafee, in his Abrams dissent Holmes 
came much closer than in his initial Espionage Act opinions to the views 
expressed in Chafee’s article.  He refused to defer to the jury verdict.  By 
repeatedly stressing that the danger of “substantive evils” must be 
immediate, he significantly limited the possibility of punishing speech 
merely for its bad tendency.  Holmes had used the phrase “clear and 
present danger” in Schenck but not in Frohwerk and Debs, indicating that 
it might have been the “passing observation” Chafee hoped it was not.  
But in Abrams, Holmes, like Chafee in his article, treated “clear and 
present danger” as the Supreme Court test while strengthening its 
protections for speech. 
It is harder to detect the influence of Hand on Holmes.  His dissent 
in Abrams did not incorporate Hand’s preference for a direct incitement 
test.  But by limiting the bad tendency approach that Hand rejected in 
Masses and by emphasizing that the probable illegal results of speech 
must be immediate in order to justify punishment, Holmes mitigated the 
problems Hand had identified in the earlier Espionage Act decisions. 
Laski himself might have had a significant role in Holmes’s 
transformation of views.  Between his first Espionage Act decisions and 
Abrams, Holmes read Laski’s book, Authority in the Modern State, which 
Laski jointly dedicated to Holmes and Felix Frankfurter.  While arguing 
for “absolute” freedom of thought, Laski wrote that it is “in the clash of 
ideas that we shall find the means of truth,” a phrase very similar to 
Holmes’s famous statement in Abrams that “the best test of truth is to 
the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market.”  Indeed, a major biography of Laski published in 1993 
concluded that Holmes’s dissent in Abrams “was almost verbatim 
Laski’s own amalgam of J.S. Mill and Charles Darwin.”96 
Beyond these possible intellectual influences, Holmes’s eagerness 
for approval from the young intellectuals who wrote for The New 
Republic at a time he felt lonely and underappreciated may have made 
him receptive to their more protective views about free speech than he 
had previously expressed.97  More generally, many Americans 
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developed a greater sensitivity to free speech during and immediately 
after World War I.  It is plausible to interpret Holmes’s transformation 
of views in Abrams as an important manifestation of this widespread 
phenomenon.  The general transformation occurred at different times 
for different people from 1917 through 1919.  Antiwar pacifists 
confronted with prosecutions under the Espionage Act were among the 
first.  Roger Baldwin, who founded the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) in 1920, became exposed to free speech issues as a member of 
the American Union Against Militarism (AUAM), a pacifist organization 
opposed to American intervention in World War I.  When the United 
States entered the war in April 1917, Baldwin became the executive of 
the Civil Liberties Bureau established by the AUAM to defend freedom 
of speech for conscientious objectors.  The Civil Liberties Bureau 
separated from the AUAM as it began to defend the free speech rights of 
more radical opponents of the war, eventually becoming the ACLU.98 
Americans who supported the war often took longer to become 
interested in free speech.  John Dewey, the eminent philosopher and 
public intellectual, wrote a series of articles in The New Republic in the 
months after the American entry into the war urging pacifists to end 
their opposition to it.  He challenged them instead to devote their energy 
to the more realistic effort of making sure that the war is fought to 
establish the international community sought by President Wilson.99  
Though he denounced the suppression of antiwar views, Dewey 
ridiculed radicals who defended themselves by invoking “all the early 
Victorian political platitudes,” including “the sanctity of individual rights 
and constitutional guaranties.”100  Yet only two months later, Dewey 
wrote another article in The New Republic contritely entitled “In 
Explanation of Our Lapse.”  The article emphasized “the increase of 
intolerance to the point of religious bigotry” in the United States, which 
prompted him to find his prior articles “strangely remote and pallid.”  In 
contrast to his recent criticisms of pacifists for unrealistically failing to 
support the proper goals of the war and of those who invoked individual 
constitutional rights against the suppression of antiwar speech, Dewey 
now warned that the prowar “liberal who for expediency’s sake would 
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passively tolerate invasions of free speech” may be “preparing the way 
for a later victory of domestic Toryism.”101 
Others became interested in free speech issues after the war ended.  
The perceived failure of the Versailles Peace Conference to achieve the 
American war goal “to make the world safe for democracy” led many 
Americans to reconsider their prior support for the war and made them 
more sympathetic to those who had been prosecuted and convicted for 
their antiwar speech.  Many who did not reconsider their views about 
the war were shocked into recognition of the importance of free speech 
by the extensive violations of civil liberties during the “Red Scare” of 
1919.102  Referring to the Red Scare, Felix Frankfurter later maintained 
in his book about Holmes that this “period of hysteria undoubtedly 
focused the attention of Mr. Justice Holmes on the practical 
consequences of a relaxed attitude” toward free speech.103 
In the most memorable paragraph of his Abrams dissent itself, 
Holmes may have been commenting on this transformation of views 
about free speech.  “Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to 
me perfectly logical,” he wrote at the beginning of a paragraph that 
ended with a strong endorsement of free speech.  “If you have no doubt 
of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your 
heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all 
opposition.”  Holmes had expressed similar views in 1918 while 
responding to a letter from Learned Hand, who advocated tolerance of 
dissent because “[o]pinions are at best provisional hypotheses, 
incompletely tested.”104  Although most would not “care enough” to 
suppress speech, Holmes replied, “if for any reason you did care enough 
you wouldn’t care a damn for the suggestion that you were acting on a 
provisional hypothesis and might be wrong.”105  Holmes added that he 
“used to define the truth as the majority vote of that nation that can lick 
all others.  So we may define the present war as an inquiry concerning 
truth.”106  Only later in the paragraph in Abrams did Holmes qualify his 
initial statements.  “But when men have realized that time has upset 
many fighting faiths,” he wrote, “they may come to believe even more 
than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the 
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas . . . .”  It 
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seems plausible that Holmes, perhaps unselfconsciously, was referring 
to the “fighting faith” in American participation in World War I that had 
been “upset” for many Americans, and perhaps for Holmes himself 
between March and November of 1919. 
VI.  TRACES IN ABRAMS OF HOLMES’S PREVIOUS VIEWS 
Though Holmes’s dissent in Abrams revealed major doctrinal and 
ideological transformations in his treatment of free speech, in two 
significant respects he did not alter his previous views.  First, Holmes 
continued to focus on the temporal relationship between speech and 
crime even as he significantly weakened the traditional bad tendency 
approach by repeatedly emphasizing that a danger must be immediate 
before speech can be punished.  He did not adopt the “direct incitement” 
standard that Learned Hand used in Masses and recommended to 
Holmes in personal correspondence.  Writing Chafee in 1922, Hand 
continued to object to Holmes’s underlying approach.  Hand observed 
that even “their Ineffabilities, the Nine Elder Statesmen” on the Supreme 
Court “have not shown themselves wholly immune from the ‘herd 
instinct’ and what seems ‘immediate and direct’ today may seem very 
remote next year even though the circumstances surrounding the 
utterance be unchanged.”  He preferred “a qualitative formula, hard, 
conventional, difficult to evade.”107  Second, by asserting that the “best 
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market,” Holmes continued to reflect the Social 
Darwinism that characterized much of his prior scholarly and judicial 
writings. 
These remnants of Holmes’s prior views did not linger in the 
subsequent First Amendment opinions of Justice Brandeis in the 1920s.  
Culminating in his concurrence in Whitney v. California in 1927,108 
Brandeis emphasized the critical role of free speech in a democratic 
society.  That opinion merits its own reassessment at 100 in 2027.  Yet 
Holmes’s dissent in Abrams, despite the traces of his prior views, 
remains the decisive break from the restrictive judicial tradition of the 
past and the foundation for subsequent interpretation of the First 
Amendment over the following century. 
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